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INTRODUCTION 
Some of the most well known models of local government present the policy-
making process as a result of the interaction of different groups of agents (actors).  The 
authors of these models typically include residents (voters), businessmen, other interest 
groups, bureaucrats, and politicians in the explanation of these models (Elkin, 1987; 
Schneider, 1989).  However, local politics is far from being an island isolated from the 
outside.  Local policy output is not only the result of the interaction of the purely local 
actors because local governments cannot do all they wish.  In fact, the most important 
constraints worth mentioning result from: 1) the state and federal intergovernmental 
action—rules, regulations, money, grants, taxes, as well as functional responsibility; and 
2) economic conditions that determine the real capacity or flexibility of choosing among 
different options—tax base, fiscal capacity, and the ratio benefits/taxes. 
The purpose of this study is to explore a research design strategy that deals with 
some of the constraints local governments face, mainly institutional constraints.   I call 
this the autonomy of local governments, and I evaluate its influence on local policy.  
Local government institutions are not at complete liberty to define their options. Since the 
combination of limits or constraints facing each local government is different, one can 
discuss the consequences and the implications of different degrees of autonomy.  This 
topic is important, as I argue in the literature review section.   In reality, in contrast to 
some other nations, American local governments have different degrees of autonomy.  
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What follows is a research strategy designed to analyze this relation.  I begin with 
a review of the relevant literature.  Following that, I propose and explore a theoretical 
model. Then I discuss the process of empirical evaluation of the hypothesis, focusing on 
the data and its analysis.  The issue of how to measure the concepts and collect the data is 
discussed. Also provided is a description of the empirical test procedures and criteria.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Study of Autonomy of Local Governments 
The literature on the autonomy of local government is basically constructed 
around two issues.  One is the identification of what limits its ability to shape its own 
policies.  Here, the works of Tiebout (1956), Peterson (1981), and Schneider (1989), are 
central.  The other issue is the justification of why this is important and what are the 
effects of different degrees of autonomy.  Here, the works of Wolman and Goldsmith 
(1990), and Goldsmith (1995) are relevant.  
Tiebout (1956) constructs the seminal model of choice in local government.  In 
his original paper, Tiebout assumes that residents have unlimited mobility and have 
varying tastes for public goods and services.  This creates a situation in which residents 
‘vote with their feet’, which is a strong incentive for competition.  Local politicians are 
driven to respond to the demands of voters, by implementing their most preferred 
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packages of services and taxes.  The theoretical result is efficiency of choice (due to 
different alternatives) and efficiency of provision (due to competition).  The structure of 
the model, can be found in economic reasoning.  For that reason, it is considered the 
basic framework of the public choice analysis of local government. 
However, the model has important drawbacks, mainly because of its unrealistic 
assumptions.  First, mobility is far from perfect, because, among other things, shopping 
costs are high.  More importantly, Tiebout´s model assumes that local governments are 
entirely independent concerning the choice of local public goods and services, as well as 
the tax burdens.  That is, Tiebout assumes they have complete autonomy to settle 
policies.  But they do not. Furthermore, the degree of autonomy varies quite a lot.  At this 
point, another famous piece of work is very important.  Paul Peterson (1981) makes the 
point that “city politics is limited politics”, which means that local governments1 “are 
limited in what they can do” (Peterson, 1981: 4).  Local government can offer different 
benefit/cost ratios to their residents.  This ratio is the relation between local public goods 
and taxes paid.  Local governments are limited because there are policies that are not 
feasible for the interest of the whole city; those policies have to do with growth.  
Different policies—developmental, distributive, and allocational (Peterson, 1981)—have 
different effects on the ratio.  This is a decisive extension of the Tiebout (1956) approach.  
Schneider (1989) joins both models and talks about a local market for public goods, 
                                                 
1 The literature on local politics and public policy uses the terms: city, urban, and local 
government more or less interchangeably referring to local institutions.  For now, I do not make the 
distinction.  Later, more precision will be needed to clearly define the population to be studied. 
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where the key agents involved interact.  The main elements in this market are politicians, 
residents, firms and interest groups, bureaucrats, politicians, as well as the external limits.  
The latter, includes economic conditions and its change, social variables (racial division), 
and intergovernmental limits.  
The local market defined this way is a descriptive simplification of the complex 
policy-making process.  In particular, it makes it easier to understand the role of 
autonomy as an element of that process.  The intergovernmental limits are what define 
the autonomy of local governments, at least, autonomy in the sense considered here.  This 
fact is much of what this research design is all about, that is, the limitations imposed by 
higher levels on local institutions. This is what I take as autonomy of local governments 
to the purposes of this study.  
In a very different sense from these models, Stephens (1974) constructs a measure 
of autonomy.  He identifies local autonomy basically as the opposite of state 
centralization. According to his definition:  
“a decentralized state is one in which local governments control 
public policy, allocate whatever resources they have at their disposal, 
and deliver public goods and services to residents.” (Stephens, 1975:52). 
With the purpose of explaining the erosion of autonomy (state decentralization), 
he develops the quantitative measure of state centralization to analyze the topic over time.  
Three components compose the measure: 
“1) Financial responsibility, or which level pays for the public goods 
and services; 
2) Determination of the level which delivers each of 15 major functional 
activities; 
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3) Distribution of public personnel between levels modified by the 
relative intensity of labor of different services rendered by state and 
local governments” (Stephens, 1997: 46).    
The composite index is a simple one, resulting in the linear combination of the 
three individual indices of centralization from each of the components.  His measure 
clearly resembles that of administrative autonomy.  For example, it does not integrate any 
component concerning the constraints facing local governments, such as regulations and 
socioeconomic constraints, nor the consequences for public policy.  Nevertheless, it is 
one of the few quantitative measures of autonomy that allows for the understanding that it 
is much more a matter of degree than a measure of a discrete variable. 
Another different treatment is due to Wolman and Goldsmith (1990).  Their 
central point is to provide the importance of autonomy to local governments.  They start 
by expressing their dissatisfaction with what they call traditional literature, which defines 
autonomy as the “discretion local governments possess to act free from control by higher 
levels of government” (Wolman and Goldsmith, 1990: 24).  They claim that the 
traditional treatments do not provide a rationale for the study of local politics: 
“Instead, we ask a much different and, to our minds, more 
fundamental question: Do local government in urban areas have 
autonomy in the sense that their presence and activities have impacts on 
anything important? Does urban politics matter?” (Wolman and 
Goldsmith, 1990: 3). 
Their answer is clear.  Yes, urban politics matter, because it can affect the well-
being of residents.  Therefore, they assume that the greater the level of autonomy, the 
greater the ability to increase the well-being of residents in the urban area.  After 
providing this definition, they explore what constitutes the well-being—for example, 
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monetary and non-monetary income and non-income welfare – and, then, try to ask 
“what scope remains available to local governments” (ib.: 24).  To determine that scope, 
it is also necessary to analyze the limitations which local governments face, that is, it is 
also necessary to use the traditional definition of autonomy.  Overall, the authors 
conclude that there is not much scope for local governments.  At first glance, this way of 
defining the question seems very appealing and appears to make sense.  It is appealing 
because it tries to advance a step further in the traditional definition.  It is also true that it 
justifies and significantly legitimizes the study of the autonomy of local government.   
Goldsmith (1995) provides different reasons for the relevance of the concept 
autonomy.  At first, the existence of elected local governments ought to imply the ability 
to ‘determine themselves’.  This is a valuable argument, which strongly rests on the 
virtues of democratic society.  The second reason is basically a ‘public choice’ argument.  
The emphasis on decentralization points to the efficiencies gained by allowing local 
governments to tailor its tax and service packages to the preferences of residents (voters).  
At the roots of this are the models of Tiebout (1956) and Peterson (1981) already 
referred, and Goldsmith (1995) adopts the arguments of this public choice approaches.  In 
this sense, he argues that autonomy (decentralization) enhances responsiveness and 
accountability.  
In sum, autonomy is identified here as the limits imposed by higher levels of 
government (Schneider, 1989; Wolman and Goldsmith, 1990; Goldsmith, 1995).  This 
definition is the one I work with in this research design.  That is, I define autonomy by 
how the intergovernmental limitations can shape local government public policies.   
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METHODOLOGY 
Having defined autonomy, the next step is to empirically evaluate its impact on 
local governments, in particular whether or not it tends to increase responsiveness to local 
public demands.   Therefore, the task is to design a research strategy that allows us to 
analyze that impact.  The research then follows: 
Research question 
Does the degree of autonomy of a local government matter to public policy and 
does it result in responsiveness to local public preferences? 
 
Definition and Measurement of Concepts 
At this point, it is necessary to define what one means the concepts employed in 
the model.  From a nominal concept, one must advance to an operational definition and 
then to its measurement.    
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Autonomy 
Up until this point, I work with a definition of autonomy, which refers the 
limitations of local governments in making policy.  Following from the explained 
literature on local government in this research design, the definition can be stated as 
follows: how far the local level of government is able to operate with some degree of 
autonomy and discretion from other levels (Goldsmith, 1995: 228).  Autonomy means the 
degree of limitations imposed by states on local government activity.   
The concept of autonomy is operationalized as an index that combines the 
different indicators (variables), such as legislation, rules, etc.  Autonomy has not only one 
or two indicators, even though, for example, financial autonomy is considered to be a key 
aspect of autonomy.  That is why I deal with an index combining all the indicators and I 
end up with a measure that is different across states.   
There are a large number of different indicators to be integrated in an index of 
autonomy.  Using the information provided in the study by the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations (1993) regarding state laws governing local governments, 
the indicators of local autonomy are grouped into six categories: 
A. Form of Government; 
B. Altering Boundaries and Responsibilities; 
C. Local Elections; 
D. Administrative Operations and Procedures; 
E. Financial Administration; 
F. Personnel Management. 
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Each of these categories includes a group of variables, which can be condensed to 
construct a unique index of autonomy.   Thus, the statistical analytic technique used to 
construct that index is factor analysis. This is the technique used to investigate the 
relationship between theoretical concepts—in this case autonomy—and empirical 
indicators.  It reduces a large number of items that are associated with each other and 
combines them into a few indices.   
However, factor analysis is not the technique I use here.  One decisive reason 
justifies the option.  Although the quantity of the data is quite large (79 variables), all of 
the variables are dichotomous in format (for example, either the state law imposes limits 
on incorporation of local government or it does not).  There is another pragmatic reason, 
which has to do with the fact that the referred study already includes a global measure 
condensing those variables (see Zimmerman, 1995: 6-7).  Therefore, I use that global 
measure as the measure of local autonomy, which varies across states.  It is my key cause 
independent variable.  
Research Design 
First of all, it should be recognized that, ideally, the best research design to deal 
with the question I have in hand would consist in a time-series strategy.  Using that 
design, each substantial change in the relations between states and local governments 
would be considered a treatment, leading to an interrupted time-series design (Spector, 
1981; Rossi and Freeman, 1993).  However, two practical reasons do not allow me to 
implement that ideal study.  The first reason has to do with the limitations in collecting 
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data to be used in reasonable time.  The second, linked with the first but goes much 
beyond that, is related with the difficulty in identifying the precise points in time in which 
those important changes happened.  This difficulty is a relative rather than an absolute 
impossibility. The relativity is in regard to the amount of research necessary and the time 
available.  Given the specific context, I study the impact of autonomy in local public 
policies through a different strategy.  Despite its own limitations, a cross section design 
turns out to be a pragmatic choice.    
In the USA federal system, there are some significant differences and some 
consistent patterns in the relations between local governments and the other levels of 
government, in particular the state level.  It is possible to discern groups of states 
according to the way they deal with state local-relations.  This is an issue that needs to be 
considered here, because the research design needs to account for it.  The question has 
implications for the process of sampling because it is necessary to ensure that there is a 
balance of local governments from all the possible patterns.  This is a decisive issue.  
Basically, it determines the degree of variability in the key cause variable (autonomy) I 
propose to study. One should remember that the degree of autonomy varies mainly across 
states, not within states.  
I divide the fifty American states in three groups of a reasonable number with 
respect to the substantial cases of state-local relations and the number of stratified 
samples.  In a 1981 study,  the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
classifies the states according to the degree of state dominance of fiscal partnership and 
according to state-local legal relationship.  In both classifications, the states are divided 
into three categories (see in Zimmerman, 1995: 207-208; Christensen, 1995: 89).  
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Another author groups the states according to the fiscal responsibility with respect to 
local governments (this division is made by Roy Bahl, 1984 and is referred in Anton, 
1989: 46).  This is the classification I use here to divide the states according to its specific 
character in state local relations (see Table 1) and to construct the sample.  Of course, 
higher financing responsibility means more intervention and responsibility of states on 
local financing affairs.   
 
Table 1- States Financing Responsibility with Respect to Local Governments 
 
High 
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, 
Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Washington, West Virginia. 
 
Moderate 
Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin. 
 
Low 
Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, 
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Oregon, South Dakota. 
 
The empirical test, then, is a cross-section of a sample of local governments 
belonging in a balanced way to each of the three groups of states considered.  The 
analytical technique used is regression analysis, which in the context of evaluation of 
impact “tries to establish whether or not the treatment is a significant predictor of 
outcome when other variables are taken into account” (Rossi and Freeman, 1993: 315).  
Of course, in this case, the treatment is the degree of autonomy and the other measures 
are the variables consistently use in the literature as causes of the level of local policy 
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output, namely local taxes, intergovernmental grants, and median income (see Farnham, 
1990 and Turnbull and Djoundourian, 1994).   
The strategy presented is a quasi-experimental design (see, among others, for 
example Rossi and Freeman, 1993).  In particular, this is a single group cross-sectional 
design (Spector, 1981).  The empirical findings are the result of the interpretation of the 
coefficients and its statistical significance, providing that the controls are considered.  It 
allows one to reject or not the impact of the degree of autonomy and, eventually, to have 
some idea about the direction of the impact.    
Another way to develop the design is to consider three different samples and run 
the same regression model to each one.  I will make this test too, but only as an 
alternative.  If the behavior of the coefficients is compared among the three groups, one 
ends up with a three-group design (Spector, 1981).  One must remember that the three 
groups are constructed according to three different levels of state-local financial 
responsibility.  However, I am aware that these comparisons can be made, but with a 
significant dose of caution.    
Collection of Data: Stratified Sampling 
Unit of Analysis: Which Local Governments? 
The are very different types of local governments: Cities (Municipalities); 
Counties; Towns and Townships; Special Districts and School Districts.  Despite the 
variety, it is more or less recognized that cities are the most important form of local 
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government in America.  Cities are “what most people think of as local government” 
(Christensen, 1995: 70).  Therefore, this study of the impact autonomy on local 
governments of United States uses cities as unit of analysis.  
Which Cities to Select? 
For related reasons, the data available in the usual governmental organizations, 
the population object of this study is all the cities of the states of the United States over 
25,000 persons.  However, it is neither possible nor desirable to use the procedure of 
simple random sampling of all of the population.  The sample should be randomly 
selected, but, at the same time, it should have cities belonging to as many states as 
possible.  In this way, it is possible to maximize the variation in the degree of the 
autonomy variable, the key cause variable.  Thus, the task is to define three workable 
preliminary samples, one for each of the groups considered (see Table 1).  The first group 
(HIGH) includes a total of 391 cities, the second (MODERATE) includes 372, and the 
third (LOW) includes 313 cities. What results from this is a process of stratified sampling 
(Babbie, 1998), which a “method for obtaining a greater degree of representativeness – 
decreasing the probability of sampling error” (1998: 216).    
After dividing the states into three groupss, I proceed to the selection of 100 cities 
in each of the groups.  Simple random selection would be a very good alternative to make 
sure that the same probability of being selected was attained.   However, I did not use that 
process.  Instead, I use systematic sampling that also allows obtain that equal probability 
but is easier to implement.   In order to do that, I randomly selected each kth city to be 
used in the selection process and also the number of the city start.  Then, I excluded the 
 13
cities selected for which the data is not available.  Given the exclusions, I end up with a 
workable sample of 259 cities.  
 
The Empirical Model 
The empirical model that results from the hypothesis proposed is the following 
regression equation.   
 
ExpendituresPC = β1 Autonomy + β2 HomeRule + β3 HomeRule * TaxPC +            
β4 TaxPC  + β5 GrantPC + β6 LogInc + ε 
 
Dependent Variables 
As the dependent variable, I use the policy output of the city, specifically, its 
expenditures in the year.  I measure the output as expenditures per capita to isolate from 
the influence of the size of the city.  In addition to that global value, three different 
regressions are run for three different policy areas – police, health, and highways 
expenditures (also per capita).  According to the classification of Peterson (1981), these 
policies are examples of allocational, distributive, and developmental policies, 
respectively.  With this procedure, I search for the different impact, if it exists, in each of 
the specific areas. 
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Independent Variables 
Autonomy is a measure of the autonomy of city, in this case the index of 
autonomy.    The primary objective is to test the causal effect of the degree of autonomy 
on the public policy output and on the three different policy areas.  The measure used 
takes values that range from 47 to 113, where higher values represent more state laws 
governing cities (ACIR, 1993; Zimmerman, 1995: 6-7).  This means that higher values 
represent more constraints, therefore less autonomy.  As is theorized in the literature, the 
more autonomy more accountability and representativeness to the demands of the 
residents in the city.  That demands are represented by the three control variables used: 
taxes, grants, and median income.  Taking those demands into account, if autonomy has 
any impact, it must be given by statistical significant coefficients.  However, the direction 
of that influence is not predicted in the literature.  One could speculate about that, but it 
would be always a risky task.  
Home Rule is a dummy variable, which takes the value of zero if the city 
possesses a provision of a broad home rule (see ACIR, 1993).    
Home Rule * TaxPC is an interactive variable between the influence of the taxes 
and the existence of home rule in the state.  The objective of its inclusion is to test the 
change in the importance of fiscal capacity to policy output, with and without home rule 
to the city.     
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TaxPC is the measure of fiscal capacity, computed as taxes received per capita in 
the jurisdiction.  It determines the availability of resources that are necessary to 
delineating the policies.  Its level corresponds to a choice of the benefit/local public 
goods package, explained by Peterson (1981).  That is, it corresponds to a policy itself.  It 
is measured in per capita values because the way the dependent variables are constructed, 
to isolate from sizing effects.  Thus, the sign of β4 is expected to be positive. 
GrantPC is the value of intergovernmental grants received and it is the second 
variable concerning the availability of resources, in this case much less controlled by the 
cities.  It is also measured as per capita values.  The sign of β5 is also expected to be 
positive. 
LnINC is the natural logarithm of the median income in the jurisdiction and it is 
an indicator of the economic conditions. As is usual in the literature, income variables are 
measured as logarithmic terms (see Farnham, 1990 and Turnbull and Djoundourian, 
1994). The sign of β6 is expected to be negative.  
Data 
The data is from 1994 edition of the County and City Data Book. The cities 
included in this edition are all incorporated places 1990 population of 25,000 or more.  
There, the data available corresponds to the year of 1990.   The variable corresponding to 
the degree of autonomy is from the 1993 study by the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations titled State Laws Governing Local Government Structure 
and Administration (also referred in Zimmerman (1995).  It was published in 1993 but I 
 16
assume, reasonably, that it corresponds to data collected before.  In addition, institutional 
changes are not expected to be significant in just a few years.  Next table shows the 
variables and its units of measurement: 
Table 2 – Variables and Units of Measurement 
VARIABLE Unit of Measurement 
Population Total Persons
Median Household income Dollars
Revenues – Intergovernmental  1,000 dollars
Revenues – Total Taxes 1,000 dollars
Total General Expenditures 1,000 dollars
Health and Hospitals  Percent of expenditures
Police and Protection Percent of expenditures
Highways Percent of expenditures
Degree of Autonomy Index ranging [47 - 113]
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The results of the main regression tested here, that is, the one concerning the 
impact of local autonomy in general expenditures per capita, is shown in the next table.   
 
Table 3 – Expenditures Per Capita 
  
Variable Coefficient T 
Autonomy -.009585 -2.168 
Home Rule -.605387 -2.861 
HR*TaxPC 2.252944 4.704 
Tax PC 1.513130 3.583 
Grant PC .126614 .491 
Log INC -.515236 -.297 
Constant 2.313599 .568 
R2 .46318  
Adjusted R2 .45040  
Standard Error .89076  
 
Globally, 46% of the variation in expenditures per capita around its mean is 
explained this multiple regression equation.  In addition, the results are statistically 
significant at the conventional levels of significance (5%).  The exceptions are the 
coefficients for the influence of grants and of the median household income in the city.  
Particularly strong are the coefficients for the influence of taxes and, in a less extent, for 
the influence of autonomy.   
It is not surprising that the coefficients related with taxes show a strong and 
statistically significant influence.  It is widely known that local taxes are the most 
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important source of city resources.  On average, each dollar increase in the amount of 
taxes per capita appears to lead, also on average, to an increase of 1.5 in the expenditures 
per capita.  What is not so expected, however, is that the strong influence is even greater 
if the city benefits from home rule statute, as the interactive effect shows.   With that 
provision, the influence of taxes is not of 1.5, but of about 3.7.  That is, the results seem 
to suggest the tendency that, providing that the city benefits of home rule, the importance 
of local resources is greater than if there is no home rule. For now, the results seem to 
suggest that home rule do matter for local public policy.  
The fact that the provision of home rule makes strong the influence of local taxes 
on local expenditures is not all the story about the importance of autonomy.  Home rule 
seems to have its own significant (not only statistical) importance.  Home rule cities are 
suggested to spend less per capita.  The coefficient is  -0.6, which means a decrease of 
about 600 dollars per capita each year.  This is not a little amount.    
The degree of autonomy is also significant and with an influence that is not 
negligible.  It can appear that the magnitude is very small, near to zero.  That is just an 
apparent idea that is not quite true.  In fact the coefficient is not very high, but it is 
certainly higher than it seems at the first look.  A value of  –0.0095 in that variable means 
a decrease of .0095 thousand dollars ($ 9.5) per change in the measure of autonomy.  It 
should be remembered that the measure ranges between 47 and 113, which means that 
change of one point in that scale does not mean much change on autonomy.   Only with 
values of 10 or so it is possible to have visible changes in state local relations.  In that 
case, the real impact is not negligible at all.  So, it appears that, globally, autonomy 
variables have impact on local public policy.     
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With the analysis of the same regressions but for the three different policy areas, 
the results are much weaker.  The next table shows the results for police (allocational 
policy), health (distributive), and highways (developmental) expenditures.     
 
Table A.4 – Expenditures Per Capita in Three Policy Areas 
 POLICE  HEALTH  HIGHWAYS  
Variable Coefficient T Coefficient T Coefficient T 
Autonomy -4.221E-04 -1.028 -3.127E-04 -.474 -2.84863E-04 -1.281
Home Rule -.060863 -3.096 -.108438 -3.436 -.004516 -.424
HR* TaxPC .246348 5.536 .242115 3.390 .061043 2.534
Tax PC .102806 2.620 074339 1.181 .007367 .347
Grant PC -.075090 -3.138 -.066853 -1.740 -.011710 -.904
Log INC .088228 .547 -.499193 -1.929 .202168 2.316
Constant -.087613 -.231 1.225762 2.017 -.378258 -1.845
R2 .37345 .16623 .11499 
Adjusted R2 .35843 .14638 .09391 
Stand. Error .08275 .13282 .04481 
 
 
The ability of these equations to explain these three policy areas is quite weak, 
specially in the case of health and highways.  One possible explanation is the fact that 
there are a significant number of cities that simply do not have one or both of these 
expenditures.  In the case of policy expenditures, the same case happens, but in a much 
lesser number of cases.  The only term that is significant in all the three equations is the 
interactive term, which have the same interpretation as in the equation of general 
expenditures.      
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A different analysis can be made if the three groups of states used for the 
stratified sample were used as single samples to be analyzed individually.  Therefore, 
each equation is applied to a sample of cities with different levels of financial 
responsibility (HIGH, MODERATE, LOW, see table 1) by the part of states.   This 
allows to replicate the analysis already did and, more important, it allows the comparison 
across samples to search any particular or systematic pattern.  I perform that analysis here 
and the results are presented and four tables of the appendix (general expenditures, 
police, health, highways): 
[Tables A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4 a bout here] 
The results are not contradictory with the ones presented before.  The individual 
policy areas are in general weaker than general expenditures.  There is an exception that 
is police expenditures, in which the results show some significant impact of autonomy 
and home rule, at least in two of the samples.  However, as before, the results are better in 
the general expenditures, in which autonomy and home rule coefficients are significant in 
at least two samples. 
But more important of all, the results of separate sample don’t seem to suggest 
any discernible systematic relation among the three different samples.  More research 
with richer data would allow a better analysis.   
 
 
 
 21
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I evaluate the potential impact of autonomy of local governments – 
an index measuring that concept and a variable of the provision of home rule – on the 
policy behavior of a stratified sample of 259 American cities.  The results seem to 
suggest that the impact exist.  The statistical significance of three variables seems to 
allow that conclusion.  The first is the impact of autonomy in its broader sense, measured 
by a condensing index of the state laws governing local governments.  The second is the 
impact of the provision of home rule to cities, measured by a dummy variable.  The third 
is an interactive effect of the influence of the provision of home rule on the magnitude of 
local taxes to the local expenditures.  All  three variables appear are statistically 
significant at the conventional levels.     
It is my opinion that the results presented here should only be considered a 
starting point in the problem of assessing the impact of local autonomy.  The results still 
raise some doubts that need to be solved, mainly concerning the specific direction of the 
influence of local autonomy and of the provision of home rule.  Better measures are 
certainly needed, namely, measures that account for the differences of state-cities 
relations within the states themselves, and not only measures of autonomy state by state. 
This is not an easy work, but it needs to be made.  The task of improving the study of 
local autonomy is, in my opinion, very important, for it is another step further in the 
study of local institutions that shape the activity and performance of local governments.  
Local institutions matter in local government, as well in other political settings.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1 – Expenditures Per Capita 
 SAMPLE 1 SAMPLE 2 SAMPLE 3 
Variable Coefficient T Coefficient T Coefficient T 
Autonomy -.012980 -3.673 .002743 1.206 -.030929 -2.067
Home Rule -.002114  -.013 -.178762 -1.462 -1.077181 -1.926
HR*TaxPC .176880 .351 .804387 2.687 3.999936 3.467
Tax PC 1.238584 2.829 1.198296 4.673 .771845 .706
Grant PC 1.393824 3.688 .918200 4.568 -.556401 -1.122
Log INC -.008141 -.086 -.129604 -1.213 -.088341 -.213
Constant 1.433476 1.416 1.272335 1.126 4.486774 .939
R2 .51692 .74212 .48662 
Adjusted R2 .48361 .72493 .45201 
Stand. Error .25917 .31484 1.35828 
 
 
Table A.2 – Police Expenditures Per Capita 
 SAMPLE 1 SAMPLE 2 SAMPLE 3 
Variable Coefficient T Coefficient T Coefficient T 
Autonomy 3.196E-04 .760 6.1334E-04 2.250 -.002626 -1.900
Home Rule -.046332 -2.306 -.036249 -2.474 -.104707 -2.027
HR* TaxPC .251829 4.205 .125370 3.494 .398655 3.741
Tax PC .015998 .307 .070676 2.300 .024871 .246
Grant PC .070238 1.562 -.009812 -.407 .136423 -2.977
Log INC .017251 1.531 .009324 .728 -.008727 -.227
Constant -.127385 -1.058 -.063565 -.469 .461699 1.046
R2 .57619 .47385 .40824 
Adjusted R2 .54696 .43877 .36835 
Stand. Error .03083 .03773 .12548 
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 Table A.3 – Health Expenditures Per Capita 
 SAMPLE 1 SAMPLE 2 SAMPLE 3 
Variable Coefficient T Coefficient T Coefficient T 
Autonomy -.001876 -.894 2.6745E-04 .291 3.5003E-04 .441
Home Rule .003490 .035 -.174889 -3.542 -.040754 -1.375
HR* TaxPC -.240763 -.805 .590745 4.885 .060796 .995
Tax PC .264509 1.017 .121554 1.174 .088383 1.525
Grant PC -.735153 -3.276 -.121573 -1.497 .027442 1.044
Log INC -.109445 -1.947 -.061999 -1.437 -.001778 -.081
Constant 1.411953 2.349 .609719 1.336 -.029974 -.118
R2 .18817 .44939 .30780 
Adjusted R2 .13218 .41268 .26114 
Stand. Error .15389 .12718 .07197 
 
 
Table A.4 – Highways Expenditures Per Capita 
 SAMPLE 1   SAMPLE 2 SAMPLE 3 
Variable Coefficient T Coefficient T Coefficient T 
Autonomy -.001107 -2.424 -2.460E-04 -.769 -3.751E-04 -.698
Home Rule -.003883 -.178 .013491 .784 -.029240 -1.455
HR* TaxPC .049294 .758 .035512 .843 .103292 2.491
Tax PC -.055700 -.984 .036411 1.009 -.018988 -.483
Grant PC .113508 2.325 .014484 .512 -.031407 -1.761
Log INC .031699 2.591 .037713 2.508 .006138 .411
Constant -.158874 -1.215 -.318422 -2.002 .062284 .363
R2 .16765 .18797 .16468 
Adjusted R2 .11024 .13384 .10836 
Stand. Error .03349 .04432 .04883 
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